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Footnotes
1. Charles D. Weisselberg and Juliana DeVries, One Term, Two
Courts: Selected Criminal-Law Cases in the Supreme Court’s 2015-
2016 Term, 52 COURT REV. 142, 150 (2016).
2. The three cases were McWilliams v. Dunn, 137 S. Ct. 1790
(2017), Weaver v. Massachusetts, 137 S. Ct. 1899 (2017), and Vir-
ginia v. LeBlanc, 137 S. Ct. 1726 (2017) (per curiam).
3. This Term, 41 decisions (59%) were unanimous and only seven
merits cases (10%) were decided by a single vote. By contrast, the
five terms before October 2015 had an average rate of unanimity
of 49% and an average of 22% of the merits cases decided by one
vote. See SCOTUSblog, Final Stat Pack for October Term 2016, at
5, http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/
SB_votesplit_20170628.pdf.
4. 137 S. Ct. 911 (2017).
5. 137 S. Ct. 1539 (2017).
6. Manuel, 137 S. Ct. at 915-17, 922.
7. Manuel, 137 S. Ct. at 918.
8. Id. at 920.
9. Id. at 916, 920.
10. Id. at 923 (Alito, J., dissenting).
11. Although Justice Thomas joined Justice Alito’s opinion in full, he
wrote separately to argue that the issue of the accrual date should
have been left open for another case. Id. at 922 (Thomas, J., dis-
senting).
Last year’s review was titled One Term, Two Courts, and itnoted some of the differences in the Court’s decision mak-ing before and after Justice Antonin Scalia’s passing.1 Jus-
tice Scalia’s replacement, Justice Neil Gorsuch, was sworn in
on April 10, 2017, too late to have an impact on the criminal
side of the 2016-2017 Term’s ledger. He participated in only
three of the twenty-two cases we discuss here,2 and none of his
votes was decisive. This was one Term, one Court.
Two characteristics mark the Term. One is a light criminal-
law docket (with some significant rulings, but no block-
busters). The other is a relatively high degree of consensus— a
high percentage of unanimous opinions—as well as fewer mer-
its cases determined by a single vote than in the five previous
Terms with a full Court.3 The October 2017 term may well be
different.
We will begin with two Fourth Amendment cases that may
illustrate the way in which an eight-member Court strove for
consensus.
FOURTH AMENDMENT
The Supreme Court decided two civil-rights cases before
Justice Gorsuch joined the bench, issuing narrow holdings,
perhaps avoiding a deadlock. In Manuel v. City of Joliet,4 the
justices addressed the threshold question whether the Fourth
Amendment governs unlawful pretrial-detention claims even if
the detention occurs after the start of legal process. In County
of Los Angeles v. Mendez,5 the Court unanimously rejected the
Ninth Circuit’s “provocation rule” in excessive-force claims,
holding that a different Fourth Amendment violation cannot
transform a reasonable use of force into an unreasonable
seizure.
UNLAWFUL PRETRIAL DETENTION
In Manuel, police officers searched Elijah Manuel during a
traffic stop and found a bottle of pills. According to Manuel,
police officers falsely claimed that there was evidence of
ecstasy, and a judge found probable cause to detain him based
on the officers’ claims. He brought a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. §
1983, alleging that he was arrested unlawfully and detained
without probable cause. The Seventh Circuit found that a
detention following a legal process could not give rise to a
Fourth Amendment claim, holding that any claim would have
to be under the Due Process Clause. In a 6-2 decision, the U.S.
Supreme Court reversed.6
Writing for the majority, Justice Kagan explained that the
Supreme Court’s precedents reflect that “pretrial detention can
violate the Fourth Amendment not only when it precedes, but
also when it follows, the start of legal process in a criminal
case.”7 If the legal process itself goes wrong—for example,
when a probable-cause determination is predicated solely on a
police officer’s false statements—the pretrial detention should
be challenged under the Fourth Amendment. Although the
Court addressed this “threshold inquiry” of which constitu-
tional right is at issue, the Court did not define “the contours
and prerequisites of a § 1983 claim.”8 Notably, the Court left
open the question of whether the Fourth Amendment cause of
action continues to accrue throughout the period of detention,
which would be critical in determining whether Manuel’s
claim is time-barred.9
Justice Alito, joined by Justice Thomas, dissented.10
Although they agreed with the Court that the Fourth Amend-
ment continues to apply after the start of legal process, they
would still have dismissed the unlawful-detention claim. They
also accused the majority of not addressing the critical ques-
tions in Manuel’s case: whether a malicious-prosecution claim
could be brought under the Fourth Amendment and whether
Fourth Amendment detention claims continue to accrue dur-
ing pretrial detention.11
EXCESSIVE FORCE
Mendez involved a police shooting of two innocent individ-
uals. Two deputy sheriffs entered a shack occupied by Angel
Mendez and Jennifer Garcia without a warrant and without
knocking or announcing their presence. Mendez, who had
been napping, rose from the bed and picked up a BB gun
nearby to place it on the floor. The deputies saw Mendez hold-
ing a gun and immediately opened fire. Mendez and Garcia
were shot multiple times. Mendez and Garcia brought a 42
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12. Mendez, 137 S. Ct. at 1545 (internal citations omitted).
13. Id. at 1546.
14. Id. (citing Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1985)).
15. Id. at 1547.
16. Id. at 1546.
17. 137 S. Ct. 352 (2016).
18. Id. at 357 (quoting Yeager v. United States, 557 U.S. 110, 121-22
(2009)).
19. 469 U.S. 57, 68 (1984).
20. 137 S. Ct. at 363-64.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 366, 367 (Thomas, J., concurring) (addressing Yeager, supra,
and Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970)).
23. 470 U.S. 68 (1985).
24. Id. at 83.
25. 137 S. Ct. 1790 (2017).
U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging several Fourth Amendment vio-
lations, including use of excessive force. The lower courts
found that the deputies acted reasonably in shooting to protect
themselves. Still, they determined that the officers used exces-
sive force under the Ninth Circuit’s provocation rule, which
holds that an officer’s otherwise appropriate use of force is
unreasonable “if (1) the officer intentionally or recklessly pro-
voked a violent response, and (2) that provocation is an inde-
pendent constitutional violation” (such as entering without a
warrant).12 The Supreme Court reversed.
In a unanimous ruling, Justice Alito wrote that the provo-
cation rule “is incompatible with our excessive force jurispru-
dence.”13 Courts should determine whether the force used is
reasonable by examining “whether the totality of the circum-
stances justifies a particular sort of search or seizure.”14 This
inquiry is dispositive; if the officer carries out a seizure that is
reasonable based on the circumstances, there is no valid exces-
sive-force claim.15 The provocation rule, however, would allow
an excessive-force claim if there was a different Fourth Amend-
ment violation, such as entering without a warrant. The Court
decried the practice of “us[ing] another constitutional viola-
tion to manufacture an excessive force claim where one would
not otherwise exist.”16 Although the Court sharply criticized
the provocation rule, it stopped short of dismissing the case.
Instead, the justices sent the case back for further analysis of
the officers’ liability under an alternative theory.
FIFTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS
This was a significant part of the Term’s criminal-law
docket, with notable rulings on double jeopardy, expert assis-
tance, compensation for wrongful convictions and disclosure
of exculpatory evidence. 
DOUBLE JEOPARDY CLAUSE
Over the years, the Supreme Court has wrestled with the
preclusive effect that may be given to inconsistent jury deter-
minations. In Bravo-Fernandez v. United States,17 the defen-
dants were convicted of federal-program bribery charges but
acquitted of conspiracy and other related offenses, which were
inconsistent verdicts. On appeal, their bribery convictions
were reversed due to an instructional error. Should the jury
acquittal prevent the government from retrying the defendants
on the bribery charges? A unanimous Court said no.
The Court’s opinion, written by Justice Ginsburg, is a
primer on issue preclusion in criminal law. When a jury
returns a verdict of not guilty on some charges but fails to
reach a verdict on a different count that depends on the same
critical issue, Yeager v. United States provides that the hung
count may not be retried because “there is no way to decipher
what a hung count repre-
sents.”18 By contrast, when there
are rationally irreconcilable ver-
dicts of both acquittal and con-
viction, the acquittal has no
preclusive effect under the rule
established in United States v.
Powell.19 The Bravo-Fernandez
case is more like Powell than
Yeager, the Court held, because
the defendants could not show
that the jury necessarily
resolved in their favor the ques-
tion of whether they violated the
bribery statute. We cannot
know which of the inconsistent
verdicts the jury really meant.
And that the bribery convictions
were later vacated for instructional error does not change the
analysis since issue preclusion depends upon the jury’s assess-
ment of the evidence in light of the allegations as presented at
trial.20 The Court thus declined an invitation to deviate from
the general rule that the Double Jeopardy Clause does not pre-
vent reprosecution when a conviction is reversed for grounds
other than insufficiency of the evidence.21 Justice Thomas con-
curred to suggest that, in an appropriate case, the Court should
reconsider Yeager and a prior case, Ashe v. Swenson.22
DUE PROCESS CLAUSE — ASSISTANCE OF EXPERTS
Ake v. Oklahoma23 is the foundational case on an indigent
defendant’s right to expert assistance. Ake establishes that
when an accused’s mental condition is relevant to criminal cul-
pability and punishment, the State must provide a mental-
health professional capable of “conduct[ing] an appropriate
examination and assist[ing] in evaluation, preparation, and
presentation of the defense.”24 The Court granted certiorari in
McWilliams v. Dunn25 to decide whether Ake requires the
appointment of an independent defense expert. It instead
decided a narrower question.
James McWilliams was convicted of capital murder. At the
jury portion of the penalty phase, the prosecution called two
psychiatrists who had previously evaluated him for compe-
tency to stand trial. The defense subpoenaed mental-health
records from the facility where he was held, though the records
did not arrive before the jury recommended a sentence of
death. Prison records and a report from a neuropsychologist
employed by the State arrived two days before the sentencing
hearing. Although the defense had asked for a continuance and
for expert assistance to evaluate the materials, the requests
The Court
granted certiorari
to decide . . .
whether Ake
[v. Oklahoma]
requires the
appointment of
an independent
defense expert
[but] instead
decided a 
narrower 
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26. Id. at 1801.
27. Id. at 1800.
28. Id. at 1800-01.
29. Id. at 1800.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 1801.
32. Id. at 1801 (Alito, J., dissenting).
33. Id. at 1804, 1806. The dissenting justices also argued that the
majority decided the case on an issue for which review was
denied. Id. at 1806-07.
34. 137 S. Ct. 1249 (2017).
35. Id. at 1253.
36. Id. at 1254. The individual must also have served at least part of a
term of incarceration for a felony conviction, and the conviction
must have been overturned for reasons other than insufficiency of
the evidence, or legal error not related to actual innocence. Id.
37. 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
38. 137 S. Ct. at 1257-58.
39. Id. at 1256.
40. Id. at 1258.
41. 505 U.S. 437 (1992).
42. 137 S. Ct. at 1258, 1258 (Alito, J., concurring).
43. Id. at 1260.
44. Id. at 1261-62.
45. Id. at 1263, 1265-66 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
46. 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015).
were denied and the defendant
was sentenced to death. His
case reached the Supreme
Court on federal habeas corpus.
In a 5-4 decision authored
by Justice Kennedy, the Court
found that the state appellate
court’s decision was contrary
to, or involved an unreasonable
application, of law clearly
established by Ake.26 Neither
the State neuropsychologist “nor any other expert helped the
defense evaluate [the] report or McWilliams’ extensive medical
records and translate these data into a legal strategy.”27 No one
helped the defense prepare arguments or testimony, nor did the
short time frame allow for more expert assistance.28 The
majority noted that, “[a]s a practical matter, the simplest way
for a State to meet this standard may be to provide a qualified
expert retained specifically for the defense team” and that
“appears to be the approach the overwhelming majority of
jurisdictions have adopted.”29 However, the majority did not
need to reach the broader question whether an independent
expert is constitutionally required, since it was clear that that
McWilliams was denied the help of any expert.30 The Court
remanded for the Court of Appeals to address whether the
error required habeas relief to be granted.31
Justice Alito dissented, joined by the Chief Justice and Jus-
tices Thomas and Gorsuch.32 Criticizing the majority for
avoiding the broader question, these four justices would hold
that Ake left open whether due process requires the appoint-
ment of a defense-team expert as opposed to simply a neutral
expert, so McWilliams could not show that the state courts had
failed to follow clearly established law.33
DUE PROCESS CLAUSE — REFUND OF FEES, COSTS,
AND RESTITUTION
The petitioners in Nelson v. Colorado34 were two defendants
whose criminal convictions had been overturned. Shannon
Nelson was acquitted in a retrial that followed an appellate
reversal; Luis Alonzo Madden was not retried after his convic-
tions were overturned. Nelson and Madden both sought return
of costs, fees, and restitution that they had paid.35 Colorado’s
“Exoneration Act” provides for refund only if a person affir-
matively brings a civil claim and proves actual innocence of the
offense by clear and convincing evidence.36 The Colorado
Supreme Court found that the Act affords the only process to
obtain a refund, and that it comports with the Due Process
Clause. Seven members of the Supreme Court disagreed.
In an opinion by Justice Ginsburg, the justices ruled that
the Act failed to afford a constitutionally adequate remedy.
The majority measured the State’s procedures under the three-
part test set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge,37 reasoning that
Mathews provides the appropriate framework since the chal-
lenge was to the continuing deprivation of property after a
conviction was reversed or vacated, and no further criminal
process is implicated. Applying Mathews, the former defen-
dants’ “interest in regaining their funds is high, the risk of
erroneous deprivation of those funds under the Exoneration
Act is unacceptable, and the State has shown no countervail-
ing interests” in retaining the funds.38 They “should not be
saddled with any proof burden” since they are presumed inno-
cent.39 The State “may not impose anything more than mini-
mal procedures on the refund of exactions dependent upon a
conviction subsequently invalidated.”40
Justice Alito concurred, but would have analyzed the issue
under the due-process framework of Medina v. California,41
which applies to rules that are part of the criminal process.42 He
would have reached the same outcome under Medina for fines
and monetary penalties, drawing in part on historical prac-
tices.43 Noting that a restitution order is much like a civil judg-
ment, however, Justice Alito would have held that refunds of
restitution awards are not constitutionally required, especially
awards that follow a final judgment later vacated on collateral
review.44 Justice Thomas dissented, arguing that there is no sub-
stantive right under the Due Process Clause to repayment of
funds that were lawfully paid to the State, and Colorado was
free to craft its own procedures, if any, for recoupment.45
The case may have a substantial impact. It clarifies which
due process test—Mathews or Medina—applies after the crim-
inal process is completed. And, of course, it instructs states not
to impose more than “minimal procedures” for reimbursement
of fees when a conviction is invalidated.
DUE PROCESS CLAUSE — VAGUENESS
Two terms ago, the Supreme Court decided Johnson v. United
States46 and held that a residual clause in the Armed Career
Criminal Act of 1984 (“ACCA”) was unconstitutionally vague.
The same language in the ACCA’s residual clause, defining a
[T]he justices ruled
that [Colorado’s
“Exoneration
Act”] failed to
afford a 
constitutionally
adequate remedy.
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47. U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, Guidelines Manual §§ 4B1.1(a),
4B1.2(a)(2) (Nov. 2006).
48. 137 S. Ct. 886 (2017).
49. Id. at 894 (quoting United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245
(2005).) Justice Kennedy joined the majority opinion but noted
that the vagueness doctrine, which is concerned with giving fair
warning to an offender and preventing arbitrary enforcement,
cannot automatically be transferred to sentencing. Id. at 897, 897
(Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kagan did not participate in the
decision. 
50. Id.
51. Id. at 895-96 (citations omitted).
52. Id. at 897, 897-98 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
53. Id. at 898, 899 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
54. Id. at 901-03.
55. 137 S. Ct. 1885 (2017).
56. Id. at 1891-93.
57. Id. at 1893.
58. Id. at 1894-95.
59. Id. at 1896 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
60. Id. at 1897.
61. 137 S. Ct. 905 (2017) (per curiam).
62. Id. at 907 (quoting Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975).)
63. 137 S. Ct. 855 (2017).
“crime of violence” as involving conduct “that presents a seri-
ous potential risk of physical injury to another,” is in the U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines and is one of the criteria that allows a
defendant to be sentenced as a career offender.47 The District
Court found that the defendant in Beckles v. United States48
qualified as a career offender under the Guidelines, and he
challenged the provision in light of the holding in Johnson.
Although the statute was void for vagueness, a majority of the
Court ruled that the relevant guideline was not susceptible to
such a challenge.
Writing for five members of the Court, Justice Thomas
relied upon the justices’ earlier ruling in United States v. Booker,
which made the Guidelines “effectively advisory.”49 Reasoning
that “[b]ecause they merely guide the District Courts’ discre-
tion, the Guidelines are not amenable to a vagueness chal-
lenge.”50 A defendant can challenge a sentence or a Guidelines
provision on other grounds, such as under the Ex Post Facto
Clause, the Eighth Amendment in a capital prosecution, or the
Due Process Clause if a court uses materially false evidence to
sentence an uncounseled defendant.51 But since the Guidelines
do not fix the permissible range of sentences, and merely guide
the exercise of discretion within the sentencing range, they are
different from statutes.
Justice Ginsburg concurred in the result because the official
commentary to the challenged guideline expressly designated
Beckles’ offense as a crime of violence.52 Justice Sotomayor
agreed with Justice Ginsburg, but wrote separately to address
the majority’s vagueness ruling. She noted that while the
Guidelines were no longer binding, they play a central role in
federal sentencing, providing the framework for the thousands
of sentencing proceedings each year.53 Justice Sotomayor con-
tended that a district court’s reliance on a vague guideline cre-
ates a serious risk of arbitrary enforcement, since the Guide-
lines functionally anchor the judge’s discretion. She also
queried how a guideline could be treated as formal law for Ex
Post Facto Clause and Eighth Amendment but not for a vague-
ness challenge.54
DUE PROCESS CLAUSE — BRADY MATERIAL
The Brady case—Turner v. United States55—arose from a
highly publicized murder prosecution in the District of Colum-
bia. The seven petitioners were convicted on a theory that they
participated in a group attack upon the victim, who was robbed,
beaten, and sodomized. Decades later, they sought to vacate
their convictions based upon evidence withheld by the prose-
cution, the most important of
which was the identity of a man
seen near the scene of the crime,
and who was arrested for attacks
in the neighborhood shortly
after the murder took place. The
petitioners sought to tie that
together with other undisclosed
evidence—noises heard by
another witness—which might
have supported a theory that the
offense was committed by a sin-
gle perpetrator, rather than a
group.56
In a 6-2 ruling, authored by
Justice Breyer, the Court found
that the suppressed evidence was “Brady information” since it
was favorable to the accused, as either exculpatory or impeach-
ing evidence.57 However, the majority agreed with the lower
courts that the withheld evidence was not material, and thus
the non-disclosure did not violate the Due Process Clause. The
guilt of a single other perpetrator would be inconsistent with
the petitioners’ guilt only if there was no group attack. Since
virtually every witness to the crime testified that it was a group
attack, the withheld evidence was insufficient to undermine
confidence in the outcome of the jury’s verdict.58 Justices
Kagan and Ginsburg dissented.59 They did not disagree on the
law, but saw the potential impact of the withheld evidence dif-
ferently, arguing that it could have changed the tenor of the
entire trial.60
In addition to these merits cases with full opinions, the jus-
tices issued a memorandum disposition worth a brief mention.
In Rippo v. Baker,61 the justices emphasized that the Due
Process Clause may require a judge to recuse himself even if he
has no actual bias. “Recusal is required when, objectively
speaking, ‘the probability of actual bias on the part of the judge
or decisionmaker is too high to be constitutionally tolerable.’”62
SIXTH AMENDMENT
The Court handed down four significant Sixth Amendment
cases last Term. In Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado,63 the Court
examined the impact of juror racial bias on a defendant’s right
to an impartial jury, and the evidence that can establish bias.
The justices also decided three noteworthy ineffective-assis-
tance-of-counsel cases. 
[T]he Court 
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suppressed 
evidence was
“Brady
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64. See, e.g., Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107 (1987) (refusing to
impeach a jury’s verdict in spite of evidence that some jurors were
under the influence of drugs and alcohol during the trial); Warger
v. Shauers, 135 S. Ct. 521 (2014) (same where jury forewoman
failed to disclose her pro-defendant bias during voir dire). Of
course, even under the “no impeachment” rule, evidence is
admissible to show that extraneous prejudicial information or
outside influences were brought to bear. See, e.g., Fed. R. Evid.
606(b).
65. Id. at 861.
66. Id. at 861-62.
67. Id. at 862.
68. Id. at 868.
69. Id. at 868-69.
70. Id. at 869.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 874, 874 (Alito, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas also wrote
separately to argue that the Court’s holding contravenes the orig-
inal understanding of the Sixth or Fourteenth Amendments. 
73. Id. at 875-77.
74. Id. at 878-81.
75. Id. at 870.
76. Id. at 884-85.
77. 137 S. Ct. 1958 (2017).
78. 137 S. Ct. 1899 (2017).
79. 137 S. Ct. 759 (2017).
80. We are not addressing Davila v. Davis, 137 S. Ct. 2058 (2017),
which relates to procedural default.
81. Lee, 137 S. Ct. at 1963-64.
82. Id. at 1964 (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694
(1984) and Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 481 (2000)).
RIGHT TO AN IMPARTIAL
JURY AND EVIDENCE OF BIAS
The Court has generally pro-
tected jury deliberations from
intrusive inquiry by barring a
criminal defendant from impeach-
ing a verdict through juror testi-
mony.64 In Pena-Rodriguez, the
Court recognized a constitutional
exception to the “no-impeachment rule” when there is clear
evidence of racial bias.
A Colorado jury convicted Miguel Angel Peña-Rodriguez of
unlawful sexual contact and harassment.65 After the verdict, two
jurors disclosed that a juror made racially biased statements dur-
ing deliberations, including his belief that Mr. Peña-Rodriguez
was guilty because he is Mexican.66 Peña-Rodriguez brought a
motion for a new trial, but the trial court denied relief under
Colorado Rule of Evidence 606(b). Like its federal counterpart,
the Colorado evidentiary rule prohibited a juror from testifying
about a statement made during deliberations in a proceeding
inquiring into the validity of the verdict.67 The state’s appellate
courts affirmed. In a 5-3 ruling, the Supreme Court reversed.
Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy emphasized the
unique nature of racial bias. Unlike other types of jury bias,
“racial bias implicates unique historical, constitutional, and
institutional concerns” and is “a familiar and recurring evil
that, if left unaddressed, would risk systematic injury to the
administration of injustice.”68 The Court also found racial bias
to be distinct in a pragmatic sense. Safeguards that generally
protect the right to an impartial jury, such as voir dire, may be
less effective in exposing racial bias and may even exacerbate
existing prejudice.69 Thus, where there is clear evidence of
racial bias, the Court held, the Sixth Amendment requires an
exception to the no-impeachment rule and permits “the trial
court to consider the evidence of the juror’s statement and any
resulting denial of the jury trial guarantee.”70 But the Court
limited the scope of this exception. An offhand comment indi-
cating racial bias or hostility is not sufficient to overcome the
no-impeachment bar. Instead, “the statement must tend to
show that racial animus was a significant motivating factor in
the juror’s vote to convict.”71
Justice Alito, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice
Thomas, dissented.72 He analogized the no-impeachment rule
to other well-established rules that limit a criminal defendant’s
ability to introduce evidence, and argued that the no-impeach-
ment rule should not be cast aside lightly.73 Justice Alito also
wrote that the majority’s holding runs counter to the Court’s
precedents and prevents jurisdictions from developing their
own evidence rules to address juror bias.74
The full impact of the Court’s holding remains to be seen.
The majority took some comfort in the fact that 17 jurisdic-
tions have already recognized a racial-bias exception.75 The
dissent noted, however, that it would be difficult to measure
the difference in the quality of jury deliberations in different
jurisdictions and expressed concern that the Court’s exception
will invite the harms that the no-impeachment rule was
designed to prevent.76
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
Lee v. United States77 is the latest in a series of rulings about
effective assistance and the immigration consequences of a
conviction. Weaver v. Massachusetts78 addresses whether preju-
dice is presumed when a structural error is raised via an inef-
fective-assistance claim or whether the defendant must estab-
lish prejudice under the Strickland standard. And in Buck v.
Davis,79 the Court held that defense counsel’s decision to call a
witness, who testified that one’s race increases the probability
of future dangerousness, was both deficient and prejudicial.80
Jae Lee was charged with possessing ecstasy with intent to
distribute. After his attorney assured him that he would not be
deported, Lee accepted a plea agreement. But his attorney was
mistaken, and Lee was subject to mandatory deportation. The
lower courts rejected his ineffective-assistance claim; although
Lee established that his attorney acted deficiently, he could not
establish prejudice because there was overwhelming evidence
of guilt.81 In a 6-2 decision, the Supreme Court reversed. 
Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Roberts began by
addressing two types of ineffective-assistance claims. Where a
defendant alleges that the attorney’s incompetence led to an
unreliable judicial proceeding, the defendant must demon-
strate prejudice by showing “a reasonable probability that, but
for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding
would have been different.”82 But sometimes a defendant
alleges that the counsel’s deficient performance led to the for-
Writing for the
majority, Justice
Kennedy 
emphasized the
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of racial bias.
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83. Id. at 1965 (quoting Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985)).
84. Id. at 1967-69.
85. Id. at 1969, 1969. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
86. Id. at 1974.
87. Id. at 1974-75.
88. Id. at 1967.
89. Weaver, 137 S. Ct. at 1906-07.
90. Id. at 1910 (internal quotation marks omitted).
91. Id. at 1911.
92. Id. at 1913.
93. Id. at 1914, 1914 (Alito, J., concurring).
94. Id. (Thomas, J., concurring). 
95. Id. at 1916, 1916 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
96. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
97. Id. at 1917-18.
98. 137 S. Ct. at 759.
99. Id. at 767-69.
100. Id. at 769.
101. Id. at 770.
feiture of a proceeding itself, such as a trial. In these circum-
stances, prejudice can be demonstrated by “a reasonable prob-
ability that, but for counsel’s errors, [the defendant] would not
have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to
trial.”83 Here, Lee had repeatedly told his attorney that avoid-
ing deportation was the determinative factor for him. Given
that accepting the plea agreement would certainly lead to
deportation, while going to trial would almost certainly lead to
deportation, it was not irrational for Lee to go to trial. Thus,
Lee adequately demonstrated prejudice.84
In a dissent joined by Justice Alito, Justice Thomas
strongly disagreed.85 He argued that Lee failed to demonstrate
prejudice because there was not a reasonable probability that
he would have obtained a more favorable result at trial given
the overwhelming evidence of guilt and the absence of a bona
fide defense.86 Justice Thomas warned that the majority’s
decision “will have pernicious consequences”87 by under-
mining the finality of decisions and imposing significant
costs. We note that this concern may be somewhat mitigated
by the majority’s admonition that judges should look to “con-
temporaneous evidence to substantiate”88 a defendant’s asser-
tion that he would not have accepted a plea deal had he been
competently advised.
The defendant in Weaver was tried in a courtroom so small
that anyone who was not a potential juror was excluded from
the room during jury selection. Kentel Weaver’s counsel failed
to object to the closure at trial or on direct review, but Weaver
later filed a motion for a new trial claiming ineffective assis-
tance of counsel. He argued that his attorney’s failure to object
violated his right to a public trial. The state courts found that
Weaver failed to establish that the error was prejudicial.89 The
Supreme Court agreed.
Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy explained that
the case required the reconciliation of two doctrines: struc-
tural error and ineffective assistance of counsel. A violation of
the right to a public trial is a structural error. If raised at trial
and on direct appeal, “the defendant is generally entitled to
automatic reversal regardless of the error’s actual effect on the
outcome.”90 Here, however, the error was raised in an ineffec-
tive-assistance-of-counsel claim, and prejudice is not pre-
sumed. When a defendant raises a public-trial violation
through an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, “the bur-
den is on the defendant to show either a reasonable probabil-
ity of a different outcome . . . or . . . to show that the particu-
lar public-trial violation was so serious as to render his or her
trial fundamentally unfair.”91 In the case at bench, Weaver
failed to establish prejudice
under either test.92
Justice Alito concurred, but
noted that the Court should not
have assumed that prejudice
might also be established
through a showing of “funda-
mental unfairness,” arguing
instead for a straightforward
application of the Strickland
prejudice prong.93 Justice
Thomas agreed with Justice
Alito, but wrote separately to
question whether the closure of
the courtroom during jury selection should be considered a
Sixth Amendment violation at all.94 Justice Gorsuch joined
the majority and concurring opinions.
Justices Breyer and Kagan dissented.95 “[S]ome errors—
such as the public-trial error at issue in this case—have been
labeled structural because they have effects that are simply too
hard to measure.”96 Instead of requiring a defendant to take on
an impossible task or require lower courts to determine which
kinds of structural errors actually undermine fundamental fair-
ness, the dissenters would grant relief as long as the defendant
can establish that an attorney’s constitutionally deficient per-
formance produced a structural error.97
In the last of the three cases, Buck, the Court examined the
impact of race-based testimony at the penalty phase of a capi-
tal case.98 Duane Buck was convicted of capital murder. Under
Texas law, the jury could impose a death sentence only if it
found that Buck was likely to commit acts of violence in the
future. Defense counsel called a number of witnesses, includ-
ing a psychologist, Dr. Quijano. Dr. Quijano prepared a writ-
ten evaluation in which he stated that Buck was statistically
more likely to act violently in the future because he was black.
Nonetheless, Buck’s counsel called Dr. Quijano to the stand,
and he testified that Buck’s race was known to predict future
dangerousness.99 On cross-examination, Dr. Quijano empha-
sized that “the race factor, black, increases the future danger-
ousness for various complicated reasons.”100 The jury returned
a sentence of death, which was affirmed on appeal. While
Buck’s case was on collateral review, the Texas Attorney Gen-
eral issued a statement concerning capital cases in which Dr.
Quijano had testified, decrying the use of race in sentencing.
The Attorney General confessed error in a number of those
cases, but not Buck’s.101 Buck argued that his counsel was inef-
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fective for introducing the evi-
dence. Writing for the majority,
Chief Justice Roberts agreed. 
Dr. Quijano’s report in effect
said that “the color of Buck’s skin
made him more deserving of exe-
cution” and, the Court found,
“[n]o competent defense attorney
would introduce such evidence
about his own client.”102 Buck also
established prejudice under
Strickland. Although Dr. Quijano
only referred to Buck’s race twice in his testimony, the Court
found that these references were not de minimis. Dr. Quijano’s
testimony tied the probability of future violence to the color of
Buck’s skin, an immutable characteristic. It also appealed to a
powerful racial stereotype. The harm to the defendant was sig-
nificant whether Dr. Quijano was called as a witness by the
prosecution or the defense.103 In the procedural part of the deci-
sion, the majority also held that Buck was entitled to reopen his
federal habeas corpus case so that the lower courts could
address his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim.104
Justices Thomas and Alito dissented from the merits and
procedural holdings. They principally disagreed with the
majority’s finding of prejudice under Strickland, pointing to
the heinous nature of the crime and Buck’s lack of remorse.105
EIGHTH AMENDMENT
The past Term saw one important ruling on the Eighth
Amendment, capital punishment, and intellectual deficits, as
well as two summary dispositions. 
In Moore v. Texas,106 the Court examined whether a state
used the appropriate standard to determine if a defendant is
intellectually disabled and may not be executed under Atkins v.
Virginia.107 A state habeas court recommended granting relief
to Bobby James Moore, but the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals declined to adopt that recommendation, finding that
Moore failed to establish his intellectual disability.108 In an
opinion written by Justice Ginsburg, the Court reversed. 
The justices held that the Texas court applied the wrong
standard for determining Moore’s intellectual disability. The
states have some flexibility, but not “unfettered discretion,” in
enforcing the ban on execution of intellectually disabled
inmates.109 Courts should look to the medical community and
“current medical standards” to inform their decisions.110 Here,
the Texas court failed to do so in two ways. First, in determin-
ing Moore’s intellectual functioning, the Texas court did not
properly adjust Moore’s IQ score of 74 by the test’s standard
error of measurement. This outcome was irreconcilable with
Hall v. Florida,111 which instructed courts to adjust IQ scores to
account for the inherent imprecision of the test. If the Texas
court had done so, Moore would have been placed within the
clinically established range for intellectual functioning
deficits.112 Second, in evaluating Moore’s adaptive functioning,
the Texas court deviated from prevailing clinical standards by
overemphasizing Moore’s perceived adaptive strengths rather
than his adaptive deficits; it also looked to Moore’s adaptive
strengths in a controlled setting, which clinicians caution
against. The Court also criticized the lower court for continu-
ing to rely on a prior Texas case and its list of “evidentiary fac-
tors,” which are grounded on lay stereotypes and have not
been followed in any contexts other than the death penalty.113
Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justices Alito and Thomas,
dissented.114 Agreeing that the Texas evidentiary factors were
flawed, he still would have upheld the Texas court’s decision
because Moore’s IQ score was above 70.115 The Chief Justice
also criticized the majority for excessively relying on the med-
ical standards and not providing adequate guidance to states
seeking to determine the bounds of intellectual disability.116
In addition to Moore, the justices also issued two summary
dispositions in Eighth Amendment cases. In Virginia v.
LeBlanc,117 the Court considered a follow-up to Graham v.
Florida,118 which requires states to give juvenile offenders con-
victed of nonhomicide offenses a meaningful opportunity to
obtain release based upon demonstrated maturity and rehabil-
itation. The Court ruled that under the deferential federal
habeas corpus standards, it was not objectively unreasonable
to find that Virginia’s geriatric release program met Graham’s
requirements.119 In the other summary disposition, Bosse v.
Oklahoma,120 the Court reversed a state court’s conclusion that
Booth v. Maryland121 was overturned. Booth prohibits a capital
sentencing jury from considering victim impact evidence that
does not “relate directly to the circumstances of the crime.”122
Payne v. Tennessee123 partially overruled Booth, but Booth
remains good law and still prohibits victim-impact evidence
that relates to characterizations and opinions about the crime
and the defendant.124 It is “this Court’s prerogative alone to
overrule one of its precedents.”125
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FIRST AMENDMENT
The Court also issued one of its first opinions to examine
the relationship between the First Amendment and the Inter-
net, Packingham v. North Carolina.126
In 2002, North Carolina made it a felony for a registered sex
offender to access commercial social-networking websites that
allow minors to create accounts.127 Lester Gerard Packingham,
a registered sex offender, was convicted of violating this statute
after he wrote a Facebook post thanking God for dismissing
his traffic ticket.128 Packingham challenged his conviction on
First Amendment grounds, and a unanimous Court agreed. 
Writing for the Court, Justice Kennedy explained that “[a]
fundamental principle of the First Amendment is that all per-
sons have access to places where they can speak and listen.”129
The Court has historically protected the right to speak in
places that are important for the exchange of views, such as
streets or parks. Noting that cyberspace, and social media in
particular, fills a similar role, the Court wrote that it “must
exercise extreme caution” before limiting First Amendment
protections to such vast networks.130 The Court assumed that
the North Carolina statute was content-neutral.131 Thus, the
law was subject to intermediate scrutiny and must not “burden
substantially more speech than is necessary to further the gov-
ernment’s legitimate interests.”132 Applying this standard, the
justices found that the government had a legitimate interest in
protecting children from sexual abuse, but the statute was
overly broad. Even if the Court were to limit the scope of the
statute to Facebook and other similar social networks, the
statute enacted an unprecedented prohibition on First Amend-
ment speech.133 States, of course, are free to enact more specific
and narrow laws, such as prohibiting a sex offender from con-
tacting a minor or using a website to gather information about
a minor.134
In a concurrence joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice
Thomas, Justice Alito expressed his disapproval of the major-
ity’s “undisciplined dicta.”135 Although he agreed that the
North Carolina law was overly broad, he criticized the major-
ity for equating the entirety of the Internet with public streets
and parks. Justice Alito focused on the fact that the the North
Carolina law encompasses a large number of websites that are
most unlikely to facilitate to commission of a sex crime against
a child, such as Amazon, the Washington Post, and WebMD.136
Limiting a registered sex offender’s access to such websites
would not appreciably advance the State’s goal of protecting
children from recidivist sex offenders.137
FEDERAL CIVIL-RIGHTS-
ACTIONS — BIVENS
The justices also made it
more difficult for plaintiffs to
bring civil-rights actions against
federal officers under Bivens v.
Six Unknown Federal Narcotics
Agents.138 In Ziglar v. Abbasi,139
the Court again addressed
claims brought by non-citizens
who were held at the Metropoli-
tan Detention Center in New
York post 9/11, based on tips
provided to the FBI. The plain-
tiffs, six men of Arab or South
Asian descent, alleged that their
detention under harsh conditions violated the substantive-due-
process and equal-protection components of the Fifth Amend-
ment, among other provisions.140 In a 4-2 ruling authored by
Justice Kennedy, the Court rejected the plaintiffs’ Bivens claim
against three high-level Department of Justice officials. 
The majority held that separation-of-powers principles are
central to the question whether a party may assert a new
implied cause of action under the Constitution. Henceforth, “a
[new] Bivens remedy will not be available if there are ‘special
factors counselling hesitation in the absence of affirmative
action by Congress.’”141 “Special factors” might include bur-
dens on government employees, projected costs and conse-
quences, or the existence of alternative remedial structures.142
Whether a case presents a new cause of action, rather than one
fitting within an already established Bivens context, may turn
on circumstances such as the officer’s rank; the right at issue;
the generality of the official action; existing judicial guidance
for the officer; the statute or other legal authority under which
the officer operated; the risk of disruptive intrusion by the
judiciary; and other factors.143 Because this case is meaning-
fully different from previous Bivens cases and because it neces-
sarily implicates special factors, the Court refused to allow the
plaintiffs’ detention claims to proceed under Bivens.144
Justice Breyer and Justice Ginsburg dissented, arguing that
the plaintiffs’ claims did not arise in a “new context” and were
not “expanding” the scope of the Bivens remedy.145 Even if the
context were “fundamentally different,” the dissent still would
have permitted the plaintiffs’ claims because no alternative
remedy was available for them, at least for a considerable time,
and there were no special factors that counsel hesitation.146
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Abbasi is a very important case for suits brought against fed-
eral officers. Abbasi has already been applied in Hernandez v.
Mesa,147 a closely watched case of a cross-border shooting by a
U.S. Border Patrol agent. There, the justices remanded to the
Court of Appeals to apply Abbasi and determine whether there
was an implied cause of action under Bivens.
FEDERAL CRIMINAL AND IMMIGRATION LAW
The Court decided three interesting federal criminal cases
on the scope of liability for criminal acts or forfeitures, plus
one about removability from the United States following a con-
viction for statutory rape. All four were unanimous decisions.
The defendant in Shaw v. United States148 was convicted of
“defraud[ing] a financial institution.” He argued that the statute
did not cover his conduct because he only sought to obtain
funds belonging to a bank depositor rather than the bank itself.
The Court rejected this claim, ruling that a bank has property
rights in accounts it holds and the statute does not require an
intent to cause the bank financial harm.149 Salman v. United
States150 holds that a conviction for insider trading under the
Securities and Exchange Act does not require that the tipper
receive something of pecuniary or like value in exchange for a
gift of information to family or friends. Honeycutt v. United
States151 addresses whether, under the federal drug-crime for-
feiture statute, a defendant convicted in a conspiracy may be
held jointly and severally liable for property that a co-conspira-
tor derived from the crime. After noting that joint and several
liability is a creature of tort law, the justices found that forfei-
ture under the federal statute is limited to property that the
defendant actually acquired as a result of the crime.152
The question in the immigration case, Esquivel-Quintana v.
Sessions,153 was whether a conviction under a statute criminal-
izing consensual sexual intercourse between a 21-year-old and
a 17-year-old is an “aggravated felony” and grounds for
removal from the United States. In making that determination,
a court takes a categorical approach—examining the statute of
conviction (not the conduct)—and decides whether the least
of the criminalized conduct fits within the federal definition of
the crime. The Court determined that “in the context of statu-
tory rape offenses that criminalize sexual intercourse based
solely on the age of the participants, the generic federal defin-
ition of sexual abuse of a minor requires that the victim be
younger than 16.”154 Thus, “[a]bsent some special relationship
of trust, consensual sexual conduct involving a younger part-
ner who is at least 16” is not an aggravated felony supporting
removal “regardless of the age differential between the two par-
ticipants.”155
THE CURRENT TERM
If the 2016-2017 Term was a bit of a snoozer, the 2017-2018
may have a blockbuster docket—and the Court is fully consti-
tuted. The past Term may have been the calm before a coming
storm. The justices will consider whether the Fifth Amend-
ment is violated when compelled statements are used at a
probable-cause hearing, but not at trial;156 whether the exis-
tence of probable cause defeats a First Amendment retaliatory-
arrest claim;157 and whether defense counsel can concede an
accused’s guilt at trial over the accused’s express objection.158
But the Court’s Fourth Amendment docket has captured much
attention, and rightfully so.
The most significant criminal-law case in the current Term
may well be Carpenter v. United States,159 which asks whether
officers need a warrant to obtain historical cell-site records. In
Carpenter, investigators went to a service provider and
acquired 127 days of Carpenter’s call records, as well as the
locations of the cell towers to which his phone connected. The
records contained an average of 101 location points per day for
more than four months’ time. The evidence was used to place
Carpenter near the scene of four robberies. The case may give
the Court an opportunity to consider the application of the
“third-party doctrine” to longer-term cell-site location infor-
mation. In addition to Carpenter, the Court will also weigh
whether an officer may enter private property without a war-
rant to search a vehicle parked a few feet from a house,160 and
whether a driver has a reasonable expectation of privacy in a
rental car when he has the renter’s permission to drive but is
not listed on the rental agreement.161
Stay tuned for a very eventful Term with a new Court!
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